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COURT OR ARBITRATOR—WHO DECIDES
WHETHER RES JUDICATA BARS SUBSEQUENT
ARBITRATION UNDER THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT?
Jarrod Wong∗

I.

INTRODUCTION

Once upon a time, courts blanched at the idea of
arbitration. Perfectly respectable people would opt to settle
their disputes by arbitration only to find that the courts
would not enforce agreements to arbitrate, never mind
arbitral awards.1 Jealous of their role and function, courts
justified their hostility on the ground that arbitration
agreements improperly “ousted [the courts] from their
jurisdiction.”2 However, the world of arbitration and the way
it is perceived by courts have undergone a revolution.
Arbitration now rivals, if it has not already displaced, court
adjudication as the preferred means of resolving civil
disputes.3 Part of this phenomenon has to do with a general
acknowledgment of the inherent advantages of arbitration
over litigation, including its ease of procedure, greater speed
and privacy, and its drawing on expert knowledge in the
∗

J.D., University of California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall), 1999; LL.M., University
of Chicago, 1996; B.A. (Hons) (Law), Cambridge University, 1995. I am grateful
to Greg Richardson for his helpful comments. All opinions and errors remain
my own.
1. See generally STEPHEN K. HUBER & E. WENDY TRACHTE-HUBER,
ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 7-11 (1998) (discussing the historical roots
of American arbitration, including traditional resistance to and eventual
acceptance of arbitration by courts).
2. Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985
(2d Cir. 1942) (citation omitted).
3. G. Richard Shell, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Effects of
Commercial Arbitration, 35 UCLA L. REV. 623, 626-27 (1988) (“Arbitration is
rapidly overtaking court adjudication as the most popular forum for the trial of
civil disputes.”).
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adjudication of the dispute.4 Another significant part of this
phenomenon has been the fostering of legislative and judicial
policies favoring arbitration.5 In particular, the Federal
Arbitration Act of 19256 renders enforceable any written
agreement to arbitrate an existing or future dispute, allowing
for the judicial review of any resulting arbitral award only on
the most narrow of grounds.7 In other words, arbitration is
today prized for its differences from court adjudication—
differences that have effectively been endorsed by the
legislature and by the parties themselves.
As with so many post-modern stories, however, this one
doesn’t end happily ever after.
Despite Congress’s
endorsement of arbitration in passing the Federal Arbitration
Act, courts still prevent parties from fully realizing the
benefits of arbitration by issuing ill-reasoned rulings on the
subject of res judicata in the context of arbitration.8
Specifically, where there has been a prior decision by a court
or arbitrator that relates to the matter at issue in a
subsequent arbitration, courts are unable to answer in a
principled way the fundamental question of who—court or
arbitrator—gets to decide whether the prior decision bars the
subsequent arbitration by virtue of the doctrine of res
judicata. The problem is that legislative policies embodied in
the Federal Arbitration Act are frustrated when federal
courts improperly determine that they, and not arbitrators,
should decide the issue. As a result, the courts impose a
judicial resolution process that the parties did not bargain
for. This increased and unnecessary judicial intervention
effectively denies parties their freedom to contract, as well as

4. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Olick, 151 F.3d 132, 137 (3d Cir.
1998) (“[A]rbitration most often arises in areas where courts are at a significant
experiential disadvantage and arbitrators, who understand the ‘language and
workings of the shop,’ may best serve the interest of the parties.” (citations
omitted)); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Belco Petrol. Corp., 88 F.3d 129, 133 (2d
Cir. 1996) (“The advantages of arbitration are well-known. Arbitration is
‘usually cheaper and faster than litigation; it can have simpler procedural and
evidentiary rules . . . .” (citation omitted)).
5. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.
1, 24 (1983) (“Section 2 [of the Federal Arbitration Act] is a congressional
declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration . . . .”).
6. Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2000).
7. Indeed, the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 was passed to counter the
then-existing judicial bias against arbitration. See infra Part III.
8. See discussion infra Part IV.
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the benefits of arbitration to which they are entitled.9
Thus, in order to provide parties assurance that the
arbitration clauses in their contracts will be respected, and to
avoid the associated and unexpected costs of litigation, the
issue of who determines the res judicata effect of a prior
decision in subsequent arbitration should be resolved
definitively. Yet courts have reached divergent conclusions
on this issue.10 Some courts have held that they should
decide the issue,11 while others have maintained that the
arbitrators should determine whether res judicata applies.12
Careful consideration of the cases, however, reveals that
these two viewpoints can be reconciled. The key to such
reconciliation is determining whether the prior decision is an
earlier judgment of the same court now deciding the res
judicata question. If the prior decision was issued by the
same court, that court should determine whether res judicata
applies.13 On the other hand, if the prior decision was an
arbitral award or a judgment issued by a different court, then
the arbitrator should decide whether that prior decision
precludes subsequent arbitration.14 In other words, the
general rule is that res judicata is an issue for arbitrators.15
The limited exception to this rule applies when the prior
decision is an earlier judgment of the same court asked to
decide the res judicata issue.16 Significantly, this rule is not
only supported by the case law, but is also justified by
fundamental principles governing arbitration.
9. See Prod. & Maintenance Employees’ Local 504 v. Roadmaster Corp.,
916 F.2d 1161, 1163 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (“Arbitration clauses are
agreements to move cases out of court, to simplify dispute resolution, making it
quick and cheap. . . . Arbitration will not work if legal contests are its bookends:
a suit to compel or prevent arbitration, the arbitration itself, and a suit to
enforce or set aside the award. Arbitration then becomes more costly than
litigation, for if the parties had elected to litigate their disputes they would have
had to visit court only once. Reluctance to see the benefits of arbitration
smothered by the costs and delay of litigation explains the tendency of courts to
order a party feebly opposing arbitration (or its outcome) to pay the winner’s
legal fees. Anything less makes a mockery of arbitration’s promise to expedite
and cut the costs of resolving disputes.” (citations omitted)).
10. See discussion infra Part IV.
11. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
12. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
13. See discussion infra Part V.
14. See discussion infra Part V.
15. See discussion infra Part V.B.
16. See discussion infra Part V.C.
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Arbitration is, above all, a matter of contract.17 This
means that no party can be forced to arbitrate an issue unless
it has entered into an enforceable arbitration agreement. By
the same token, where parties have agreed to arbitrate an
issue, they should be held to that agreement, and any dispute
arising in relation thereto should be resolved by arbitration,
not through the courts. As explained below, the defense of res
judicata, like any other affirmative defense,18 is part of the
merits of the dispute and should be resolved accordingly.19
Therefore, when parties agree to arbitrate an issue, they
necessarily agree to arbitrate any affirmative defense relating
thereto, including that of res judicata, unless they specifically
provide otherwise. In the absence of any legal or equitable
grounds for revoking these contracts, courts must respect
such arbitration agreements by enforcing them under the
Federal Arbitration Act, thereby allowing arbitrators to
determine the res judicata effect of prior decisions.20
However, where the prior decision is a judgment issued
by the court that is being asked to compel arbitration, a
different result is called for. In this instance, the ability of
the court to protect the integrity and the effectiveness of its
own judgments is uniquely at stake. Having issued the
decision in question, the court is best qualified to assess its
scope and effects, including the extent to which it bears on
the question of the preclusion of subsequent arbitration.
Under these exceptional circumstances, the court rather than
the arbitrator should be called upon to consider any
preclusion issues arising from the prior judgment.
In sum, the general rule is that arbitrators should
determine the res judicata effect of prior decisions on
subsequent arbitration, except when the prior decision is the
court’s own judgment. Where the earlier decision is that of
the same court, the court should decide the res judicata issue.
This article is structured as follows. Part II briefly reviews
the concept of res judicata and its general application in the
context of arbitration.
Part III examines the Federal
Arbitration Act and the context in which preclusion issues
17. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
18. Examples of affirmative defenses to a claim include laches and the
statute of limitations. See infra text accompanying note 138.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 89-90, 103, 138.
20. See 9 U.S.C. § 2.
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affecting subsequent arbitration arise before federal courts.
Part IV discusses some of the relevant decisions regarding
who should determine whether res judicata bars subsequent
arbitration, and notes the apparent divergence of authorities.
Part V reconciles the cases to disprove the idea that any true
divergence exists, and explains the proposed rule. Part VI
examines Supreme Court decisions on the more general
question of who should decide whether any particular dispute
is arbitrable, and analyzes their relevance to the proposed
rule. Finally, Part VII, while noting the general applicability
of the proposed rule, examines and clarifies particular
situations in which its application is more complex.
II. RES JUDICATA
The doctrine of res judicata refers to the binding effect of
a judgment in a prior case on the claims or issues in
subsequent litigation.21 Conceptually, the doctrine has two
primary applications, sometimes referred to as true res
judicata, or claim preclusion, and collateral estoppel, or issue
preclusion.22 True res judicata prevents a party from suing
on a claim or cause of action that has or could have been
determined by a competent court in a final and binding
judgment.23
Collateral estoppel prevents relitigation of
specific issues actually litigated and determined by a final
judgment, where the issues were essential to the judgment.24
This article is primarily concerned with true res judicata, and
any reference herein to res judicata is to true res judicata,
unless otherwise indicated.25

21. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1336-37 (8th ed. 2004).
22. See, e.g., Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77
n.1 (1984) (explaining that res judicata “consist[s] of two preclusion concepts:
‘issue preclusion’ and ‘claim preclusion’”).
23. See 18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE §
131.10[1][a] (3d ed. 2000) (“Claim preclusion prevents a party from suing on a
claim which has been previously litigated to a final judgment by that party or
such party’s privies and precludes the assertion by such parties of any legal
theory, cause of action, or defense which could have been asserted in that
action.”).
24. See Migra, 465 U.S. at 77 n.1; 18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., supra note
23, § 131.10[1][a] (“Issue preclusion prevents relitigation of issues actually
litigated and necessary for the outcome of the prior suit, even if the current
action involves different claims.”).
25. It is important to keep the two applications separate because, as we
shall see, the answer to the question concerning who should determine the
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There are several policy considerations underpinning the
doctrine of res judicata. First, the nature of courts requires
that their judgments be treated as final and authoritative;
courts do not sit to render “advisory opinions.”26 Second, the
parties are entitled to repose.27 Third, both the public and the
parties should be protected against the costs associated with
duplicative litigation.28 Finally, the integrity of the judicial
system is threatened by the prospect of inconsistent and
conflicting outcomes.29 In sum, the doctrine of res judicata
serves to secure finality in judicial proceedings and to
promote the efficient administration of justice.30
It is well-settled that the doctrine of res judicata and its
underlying policies apply in equal measure to arbitral
awards.31 The Second Restatement of Judgments provides
that “a valid and final award by arbitration has the same
effects under the rules of res judicata, subject to the same
exceptions and qualifications, as a judgment of a court.”32
Indeed, as one commentator has noted, “courts have long held
that res judicata applies to arbitration awards.”33 This
statement is logical, given the strong legislative and judicial
policies favoring arbitration. After all, arbitration cannot be
a fully effective alternative to litigation if parties who have
elected to arbitrate a dispute are permitted to litigate matters
determined in a prior arbitration. If anything, the doctrine of
res judicata should be applied even more assiduously in the

preclusive effects of a prior decision may vary depending on whether true res
judicata or collateral estoppel is involved. See infra Part VII.C.
26. See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRECLUSION IN CIVIL
ACTIONS 14 (2001).
27. See id. at 16.
28. See id. at 16-17.
29. See id. at 18.
30. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979).
31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 84(1) (1982) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT]; see also Dial 800 v. Fesbinder, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 711, 724 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2004) (“As a general matter, an arbitration award is the equivalent of a
final judgment which renders all factual and legal matters in the award res
judicata.” (citation omitted)); Apparel Art Int’l, Inc. v. Amertex Enters., 48 F.3d
576, 585 (1st Cir. 1995) (“An arbitration award generally has res judicata effect
as to all claims heard by the arbitrators.” (citations omitted)); Simpson v.
Westchester, 773 N.Y.S.2d 881, 882 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (noting that “the
doctrine of res judicata applies to arbitration awards”).
32. RESTATEMENT, supra note 31, § 84(1).
33. Shell, supra note 3, at 641 (citing N.Y. Lumber & Wood-Working v.
Schnieder, 119 N.Y. 475 (1890); Brazill v. Isham, 12 N.Y. 9 (1854)).
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context of arbitration, since the intent underlying both
concepts is to avoid unnecessary litigation.34 It would be
ironic to find that purpose thwarted at precisely the point
where the two coincide. Indeed, a failure to apply res judicata
to arbitral awards would deviate from the spirit, if not the
letter, of the Federal Arbitration Act (the “Act” or
“Arbitration Act”).35
III. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
In enacting the Arbitration Act, Congress sought to
“reverse[] centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration
agreements” by “plac[ing] arbitration agreements ‘upon the
same footing as other contracts.’”36 The Act accomplishes this
purpose by providing in § 2, the operative core of the
Arbitration Act, that:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to
settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of
such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the
whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to
submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of
such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.37

Thus, all arbitration agreements involving transactions
that affect interstate and international commerce are subject
to the Arbitration Act,38 which requires their enforcement
except under limited circumstances.39 In more general terms,
the Arbitration Act federalizes arbitration law and “creates a
34. Cf. Miller Brewing Co. v. Fort Worth Distrib. Co. Inc., 781 F.2d 494, 497
n.3 (5th Cir. 1986) (“[A]rbitration is ordinarily preferable to litigation, but to
allow arbitration on top of the protracted litigation in this case would be to add
insult to injury. The doctrine of res judicata . . . [has] probably done more to
prevent useless and wasteful litigation than arbitration ever could.”).
35. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
36. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1974) (quoting H.R.
Rep. No. 68-96 at 2 (1924)).
37. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
38. Section 1 of the Act defines “commerce,” in part, as “commerce among
the several States or with foreign nations.” Id. § 1.
39. Id. (“[N]othing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment
of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign
or interstate commerce.”).
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body of federal substantive law establishing and regulating
the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate.”40
The Arbitration Act permits district court involvement in
the arbitration process in two primary ways.41 The first
arises prior to arbitration when a party resists arbitration
under an existing arbitration clause.42 In such a case, the Act
allows a district court to compel or enjoin arbitration as the
circumstances may dictate.43
The second arises after
arbitration when enforcement of an arbitral award is
sought.44 There, the statute authorizes the district court to
confirm, vacate, or modify the award under a narrow scope of
judicial review.45
Beyond these two circumscribed functions, the Act does
not authorize court involvement in enforcing arbitration.
Indeed, courts are “to exercise the utmost restraint and to
tread gingerly before intruding upon the arbitral process.”46
The reason for this restrained approach is that “[a]rbitration
is, above all, a matter of contract and courts must respect the
parties’ bargained-for method of dispute resolution.”47 The
idea behind the Act is that arbitration “is a matter of consent,
not coercion, and parties are generally free to structure their
arbitration agreements as they see fit.”48 However, where the
parties have agreed to arbitrate a dispute, the Act requires
that they be held to their agreement.49 As the Supreme Court
has noted, the “passage of the Act was motivated, first and
foremost, by a congressional desire to enforce agreements into
which parties had entered.”50 The net effect is that the Act
40. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25
n.32 (1983).
41. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Olick, 151 F.3d 132, 136 (3d Cir.
1998) (citing Local 103 of the Int’l Union of Elec., Radio, & Mach. Workers v.
RCA Corp., 516 F.2d 1336, 1339 (3d Cir. 1975)).
42. Id.
43. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4 (2000); PaineWebber Inc. v. Hartmann, 921 F.2d
507, 511 (3d Cir. 1990).
44. See Olick, 151 F.3d at 136.
45. 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-11.
46. Lewis v. Am. Fed’n of State, County, & Mun. Employees, 407 F.2d 1185,
1191 (3d Cir. 1969).
47. Olick, 151 F.3d at 136-37 (citing Local 1545, United Mine Workers v.
Inland Steel Coal Co., 876 F.2d 1288, 1293 (7th Cir. 1989)).
48. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,
489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989).
49. See 9 U.S.C. § 2.
50. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1984) (footnote
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strongly favors a policy of respecting agreements to arbitrate,
and courts must avoid intruding upon arbitration proceedings
in the absence of explicit statutory authorization.
Accordingly, when a party raises the defense of res
judicata in resisting arbitration, the court’s task under the
Act is limited to determining whether the parties agreed to
arbitrate the particular dispute, and ordering the parties to
proceed to arbitration “in accordance with the terms of the
More
agreement” when such agreement is found.51
specifically, in order to compel arbitration, the district court
must first affirmatively answer the following questions: (1)
whether the parties seeking or resisting arbitration have a
valid arbitration agreement; and (2) whether the particular
dispute between those parties—in this case, the question of
res judicata—falls within the contours of the arbitration
agreement.52 These two issues determine the “arbitrability”
of the dispute.53 In any event, it is plain that both questions,
however defined, must be proved and answered in the
affirmative before the court may compel arbitration under the
Arbitration Act. Where these questions are answered in the
affirmative, the court’s duty under the Arbitration Act, absent
any “grounds that exist at law or [in] equity for the revocation
of any contract,”54 is to compel arbitration and allow the
omitted).
51. 9 U.S.C. § 4.
52. See Olick, 151 F.3d at 137 (noting that under the Arbitration Act, both
questions were “threshold questions [that] a district court must answer before
compelling or enjoining arbitration”); see also PaineWebber Inc. v. Hartmann,
921 F.2d 507, 511 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that courts need only “engage in a
limited review to ensure that the dispute is arbitrable—i.e., that a valid
agreement to arbitrate exists between the parties and that the specific dispute
falls within the substantive scope of that agreement”).
53. Olick, 151 F.3d at 137. Some authorities refer to “arbitrability” only in
terms of either Question (1) or (2). See, e.g., First Options of Chicago, Inc. v.
Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942, 944-45 (referring only to Question (1) as involving
“arbitrability”); JOHN S. MURRAY ET AL., ARBITRATION 107 (1996) (referring only
to Question (2) as a matter of “arbitrability”). Arguably, however, the question
of “arbitrability” necessarily encompasses both questions since both questions
are distinct and must be answered before one can conclude that a dispute is in
fact arbitrable. See also Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Belco Petrol. Corp., 88 F.3d
129, 135 (2d Cir. 1996) (“The ‘arbitrability’ of a dispute comprises the questions
of (1) whether there exists a valid agreement to arbitrate at all under the
contract in question . . . and if so, (2) whether the particular dispute sought to
be arbitrated falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement.”). This article
therefore employs the term “arbitrability” to include both questions.
54. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
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arbitrator to adjudicate the substantive dispute from that
point forward. On the other hand, if the court finds that the
issue is not arbitrable, then the court gets to decide the res
judicata question.
While this two-part process represents the proper
framework in which to analyze arbitrability under the
Arbitration Act, courts have not always been systematic in
approaching this inquiry. Courts do not always explain the
statutory context in which the claims arise or ground their
reasoning in the structure of the Act.55 For example, some
courts have simply focused on the question of whether the
court or the arbitrator is the more appropriate
decisionmaker.56 Although this question has relevance to the
broader inquiry, it is only part of that inquiry.57 The
sometimes haphazard manner in which the courts have
approached this problem has only contributed to the
appearance of an incoherent case law in which the federal
courts are stubbornly split on the question of who should
determine the issue of res judicata.
IV. THE APPARENT DIVERGENCE OF AUTHORITIES
In addressing the question of whether courts or
arbitrators should decide the res judicata issue, the federal
courts have reached seemingly disparate and conflicting
conclusions. Some courts of appeals have held that the
preclusive effect of a prior decision on subsequent arbitration
is to be decided by a court,58 while others have ruled that it
should be decided by an arbitrator.59 Yet other courts of

55. See, e.g., In re Y & A Group Sec. Litig., 38 F.3d 380, 382-83 (8th Cir.
1994) (holding that a court should determine the res judicata question by
focusing on a court’s power to defend its judgment but without specifically
relating it to the Arbitration Act).
56. See, e.g., id. at 383 (holding that the court should decide the res judicata
issue where the prior decision at issue was a judgment of the court because
“[t]he district court, and not the arbitration panel, is the best interpreter of its
own judgment”).
57. See infra Part V.
58. See, e.g., In re Y & A, 38 F.3d at 383; Kelly v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 985 F.2d 1067, 1068 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510
U.S. 1011 (1993).
59. See, e.g., Consol. Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 12,
Local Union 1545, 213 F.3d 404, 407 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he question of the
preclusive force of the first arbitration is, like any other defense, itself an issue
for a subsequent arbitrator to decide.”); Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys.,
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appeals have determined that it should be decided by both
courts and arbitrators.60
A. Cases Holding that the Court Should Determine the Res
Judicata Issue
Two notable cases holding that the court should
determine the res judicata issue are Kelly v. Merrill Lynch61
and In re Y & A Securities Litigation.62
In Kelly, plaintiff customers initially brought a suit in
federal court against Merrill Lynch alleging violations of
federal securities laws. An agreement between the parties
provided that “[e]xcept to the extent that controversies
involving claims arising under the federal securities laws may
be litigated, any controversy between [the parties] . . . shall
be settled by arbitration.”63 After the district court granted
summary judgment to Merrill Lynch on those claims,
plaintiffs initiated arbitration of several state common-law
claims. Merrill Lynch considered these state claims to be
based on the same conduct underlying the earlier litigation,64
and responded by filing a motion for a preliminary injunction
against the arbitration, which the court granted.65
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that
res judicata barred arbitration because the plaintiffs could
have, but did not, bring their state law claims in the earlier
litigation.66 In doing so, the court determined that the district
court, rather than the arbitrator, should determine the res
judicata effect of prior litigation.67 Noting the Act’s policy
favoring arbitration, the court stated that “the general rule
for deciding which questions belong to the courts is that,
Inc., 207 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2000); Indep. Lift Truck Builders Union v. NACCO
Materials Handling Group, Inc., 202 F.3d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he
preclusive effect of an arbitrator’s decision is an issue for a subsequent
arbitrator to decide.”); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Belco Petrol. Corp., 88 F.3d
129 (2d Cir. 1996).
60. See, e.g., John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Olick, 151 F.3d 132, 138-40
(3d Cir. 1998).
61. Kelly v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 985 F.2d 1067
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1011 (1993).
62. In re Y & A Group Sec. Litig., 38 F.3d 380 (8th Cir. 1994).
63. Kelly, 985 F.2d at 1068 n.1.
64. Id. at 1068.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1070.
67. Id. at 1069.
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while federal courts can decide if an issue is arbitrable or not,
they cannot reach the merits of arbitrable issues.”68
Notwithstanding this rule, however, the court rejected
plaintiffs’ argument that the issue of res judicata, as an
affirmative defense that went to the merits of the claims,
should be left to arbitration.69 The court held instead that
courts could decide res judicata, as the issue was “not just one
of preventing the piecemeal litigation that occurs when
parties simultaneously assert claims in several forums, but of
protecting prior judgments.”70
Similarly, in In re Y & A Group Securities Litigation,71
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court’s decision to enjoin arbitration on the grounds that it
was precluded by a prior consent judgment.72 In In re Y & A,
the arbitration panel had previously considered, but rejected,
the argument that arbitration was precluded.73 This means
that the court of appeals determined not only that a district
court should determine the res judicata issue, but that it
could also override an arbitrator’s decision on that issue.
Rejecting the appellant’s argument that the district court was
not permitted to reconsider the arbitration panel’s decision,
the court of appeals noted that the panel’s decision was
ultimately based on its interpretation of the settlement
agreement incorporated in the district court’s final
judgment.74 Therefore, it was “[t]he district court, and not the
arbitration panel, [who was] the best interpreter of its own
judgment,” and who had the final say in the matter.75
While Kelly and In re Y & A stand for the proposition
that courts should determine the res judicata issue, as set
forth in the following section, other cases have concluded that
the arbitrator, and not the court, should determine the res
judicata effect of a prior decision.

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. (citations omitted).
Kelly, 985 F.2d at 1069.
Id.
In re Y & A Group Sec. Litig., 38 F.3d 380 (8th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 381.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 383.
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B. Cases Holding that the Arbitrator Should Determine the
Res Judicata Issue
More recently, some courts have held instead that the
arbitrator should decide the res judicata issue. Two notable
cases are National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Belco
Petroleum Corp.76 and Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic
Systems, Inc.77
National Union was one of the first federal appellate
decisions to depart from precedent by determining that the
arbitrator should decide the res judicata issue, thereby
creating an apparent divergence of authority.78 In that case,
the insured, (“Belco”), had been awarded $144.9 million
(ninety percent of its $161 million loss) plus interest in a prior
arbitration against the insurers (“National Union”) for certain
oil exploration and development operations seized by the
Peruvian government.79 These seized interests were covered
under a confiscation, expropriation, and deprivation
insurance policy issued by National Union.80 The following
year, Belco separately recovered $2.925 million under a
maritime insurance policy with an expropriation endorsement
issued by a different insurer, Seahawk International
Associates, Inc., covering certain vessels that had also been
taken by Peru.81 Subsequently, National Union served Belco
with a demand for arbitration under the expropriation policy,
seeking to recoup a portion of the $2.925 million proceeds on
the ground that National Union’s expropriation policy
required any recoveries for loss outside the policy to be shared
between the insurers.82
Belco responded by seeking a
declaratory judgment in federal court that National Union’s
claim was barred by res judicata.83
National Union
subsequently filed a petition to compel arbitration.84 The
district court held that the arbitrator should decide the res
76.
1996).
77.
2000).
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Belco Petrol. Corp., 88 F.3d 129 (2d Cir.
Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir.
See Nat’l Union, 88 F.3d at 136.
Id. at 131.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 132.
Nat’l Union, 88 F.3d at 132.

WONG_FINAL.DOC

62

11/28/2005 1:17 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol: 46

judicata issue, and accordingly granted National Union’s
petition to compel arbitration.85
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district
court’s order compelling arbitration.86 Critical to the decision
was the fact that the arbitration clause was broadly rendered
to include “[a]ll disputes which may arise under or in
connection with [the expropriation] policy”87 and that under
the Arbitration Act, “any doubts concerning the scope of
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”88
Belco’s claim of preclusion was no more than a legal defense
to National Union’s claim, and as such, was “itself a
component of the dispute on the merits,”89 being “as much
related to the merits as such affirmative defenses as a time
limit in the arbitration agreement or laches, which are
assigned to an arbitrator under a broad arbitration clause
similar to the one in the [expropriation policy].”90
Like the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the Ninth
Circuit, in Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc.,91
held that the res judicata effect of a prior arbitral award on a
subsequent arbitration should be decided by an arbitrator
rather than the court.92 In Chiron, the plaintiff biotechnology
company entered into a joint business arrangement with the
defendant company.93 The agreement memorializing the joint
undertaking provided for the arbitration of any disputes
arising thereunder.94 When a dispute arose between the
parties, the plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action in
federal court seeking an order compelling arbitration of the
dispute.95 In response, the defendant moved for summary
judgment on the ground that a prior arbitral award issued in
favor of the defendant operated as res judicata to all claims
the plaintiff sought to raise in a second arbitration

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
2000).
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id. at 136.
Id. at 132.
Id. at 135.
Id.
Nat’l Union, 88 F.3d at 136 (citations omitted).
Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir.
See id. at 1132.
Id. at 1128.
Id.
Id. at 1129.
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proceeding.96 The district court concluded, however, that the
res judicata defense was itself an arbitrable issue within the
scope of the parties’ agreement, and therefore granted the
plaintiff’s request for an order compelling a second
arbitration.97 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
decision of the district court.98
Notably, while the defendant acknowledged that the
dispute itself was subject to arbitration, it argued that a
defense of res judicata should be treated differently from the
merits of the dispute.99 The defendant’s argument was
premised on the notion that the court would make a better
decision than an arbitrator or that it was unfair to leave the
issue to an arbitrator.100 Rejecting these arguments, the court
of appeals instead affirmed the contractual nature of
arbitration, noting that the defendant had already elected to
arbitrate all disputes under the parties’ agreement.101 The
court further noted that the detailed procedures for alternate
dispute resolution as negotiated by the parties demonstrated
that the defendant’s election to arbitrate was deliberate.102
Citing National Union with approval, the court observed that
the res judicata defense, like any other affirmative defense,
was part of the merits of the dispute that was plainly
arbitrable under the unambiguously broad arbitration clause
in the agreement between the parties.103 Therefore, the court
held that the arbitrator should decide the issue of res
judicata.
C. Cases Holding that Both the Court and the Arbitrator
Should Determine the Res Judicata Issue
In addition, a third category of cases has held that both
the court and the arbitrator should decide the res judicata
issue. In John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Olick,104
96. Id.
97. Chiron, 207 F.3d at 1129.
98. Id. at 1134.
99. Id. at 1132.
100. Id.
101. See id. The parties’ agreement provided that the parties were to submit
to arbitration “any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relating to” the
agreement. Id. at 1128.
102. See id. at 1132.
103. See Chiron, 207 F.3d at 1132, 1134.
104. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Olick, 151 F.3d 132 (3d Cir. 1998).
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the Third Circuit addressed the preclusive effects of both a
prior court judgment and a prior arbitral award on
subsequent arbitration, and held that the court should decide
the former, whereas the arbitrator should resolve the latter.
In that case, an employee (Olick) had filed a Statement of
Claim with the National Association of Securities Dealers
(“NASD”) against his employer, John Hancock, seeking the
In response, the
arbitration of certain tort claims.105
employer sought a declaration in federal court that Olick’s
claims before the NASD were barred by res judicata as a
result of two prior decisions.106 One of the decisions was an
arbitral award issued a year earlier by NASD in favor of
Olick in an arbitration between the parties relating to certain
limited partnership transactions.107 The other decision was a
district court judgment denying an action brought by third
parties against both Olick and the employer and in which
Olick had cross-claimed against the employer.108
The district court denied the employer’s request for the
declaration on the grounds that the arbitrator, rather than
the court, should determine res judicata issues under the
Arbitration Act.109 The employer then filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the court also denied.110 In so doing,
the district court expressly declined to apply case law cited by
the employer for the proposition that courts, and not
arbitrators, determine res judicata issues stemming from a
prior judgment rendered by a federal court.111 The court
noted that the cited case law was distinguishable from the
“hybrid” situation before it, which involved “both a prior
arbitration and a prior federal court decision.”112 On appeal,
the Third Circuit rejected such a distinction as simplistic and
unhelpful.113 Instead, it proceeded to analyze separately the
res judicata effect arising from the prior judgment, and
105. See id. at 134.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. Id.
110. Olick, 151 F.3d at 134.
111. See id. These cases include In re Y & A Group Securities Litigation, 38
F.3d 380 (8th Cir. 1994), and Kelly v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 985 F.2d 1067 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1011 (1993), both of
which were discussed above. See supra Part IV.A.
112. Olick, 151 F.3d at 134.
113. Id. at 138-39.
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arbitral award, respectively.114
With respect to the judgment, the Third Circuit observed
that “many federal courts have held as a matter of law that
claims of res judicata based on a prior federal judgment must
be decided by the district court before compelling or enjoining
arbitration,”115 although it also noted that not all courts had
reached the same conclusion.116 Significantly, however, this
position was adopted in an earlier Third Circuit decision,
Telephone Workers Union of New Jersey v. New Jersey Bell
Telephone Co.,117 which the lower court in Olick had declined
to apply because of the “hybrid” situation.118 Ultimately, the
court of appeals followed its own precedent and resolved the
issue in favor of district court jurisdiction to decide the effect
of the res judicata defense, and thereby reversed the district
court’s decision on that issue.119 Regarding the arbitral
award, however, the court of appeals reached the opposite
conclusion, holding that the district court had correctly
determined that the arbitrator should decide its res judicata
effect.120
The court explained this difference in result by referring
to the terms of the parties’ arbitration agreement. Under
that agreement, the parties were to submit any dispute
arising out of the business of any NASD member to
arbitration, and any resulting arbitral awards were to be
“final and not subject to review or appeal.”121 The agreement
further provided that the arbitrators were empowered to
interpret and determine the applicability of all provisions of
the relevant arbitration procedure.122 Since the question of
res judicata goes to the nature and extent of the finality of
the award, which the parties had agreed was a matter for
arbitrators, it was for the arbitrator and not the court to
114. Id. at 139 (“When a party resisting arbitration bases its claim of res
judicata not only on a prior judgment but also on the existence of a prior
arbitration, the analysis must focus on each aspect of the claim; hybrid facts do
not call for a hybrid analysis.”).
115. Id. at 137 (citations omitted).
116. See id. at 137-38.
117. Tel. Workers Union of N.J. v. N.J. Bell Tel. Co., 584 F.2d 31 (3d Cir.
1978).
118. Olick, 151 F.3d at 138-39.
119. See id. at 139.
120. Id. at 140.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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determine the preclusive effect of the prior arbitration
award.123 In sum, the court of appeals held that the district
court should determine the res judicata effect of its judgment,
whereas the arbitrator should decide the res judicata effect of
an arbitral award.
D. Summing Up the Three Categories of Cases
As set forth above, courts are seemingly divided on the
question of who decides the merits of a res judicata defense.
The answer appears to vary depending on whether the court
chooses to emphasize the contractual nature of arbitration, in
which case arbitrators will determine the res judicata issue,
or to focus instead on the need to protect the integrity of the
prior decision, in which case the court gets to decide the issue.
As explained below, however, both concerns are valid and
have their place within the framework of the Arbitration Act.
The key to making sense of this discrepancy is to recognize
that a different concern properly predominates depending on
the nature of the prior decision. Where the prior decision is a
judgment issued by the same court being asked to compel
arbitration, the court’s need to protect its own judgments
overrides any agreement by the parties to submit the res
judicta issue to arbitration. Where the prior decision is an
arbitral award or a judgment issued by a different court, the
court cannot be said to be protecting its own judgments, and
the parties’ agreement to refer the res judicata issue to
arbitration thereby assumes priority.
V. THE GENERAL RULE, ITS LIMITED EXCEPTION, AND THEIR
RATIONALES
The following rule reconciles the divergent holdings
regarding whether the court or arbitrator determines the res
judicata effect of a prior decision: An arbitrator should decide
the res judicata effect of prior decisions on subsequent
arbitration, except when the prior decision at issue is the
court’s own judgment. Only when the prior decision is the
court’s own judgment should the court determine the res
judicata issue.
Analysis of the cases discussed in Part IV illustrates and
confirms this rule.
In cases that determined that an
123. Id.
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arbitrator should decide the res judicata defense—National
Union and Chiron—the decision-maker considered the
preclusive effects of a prior arbitral award. By contrast, in
cases that concluded that a court should decide the res
judicata issue—Kelly and In re Y & A—the decision-maker
was concerned with the preclusive effects of prior judgments
that were issued by the same courts being asked to compel
Olick, however, provides the clearest
arbitration.124
illustration of this distinction because it held that the district
court’s prior judgment and the arbitral award should be
determined by the district court and the arbitrator
respectively.125 Indeed, many of the federal appellate courts
that have dealt with this issue have reached a result that
comports with the Olick distinction, even if the underlying
rationale is not clearly articulated.126
The proper analysis in determining whether the court or
arbitrator should decide the issue of res judicata begins with
two questions: (1) Did the parties enter into a valid
agreement to arbitrate?, and (2) Is the res judicata defense
within the scope of the agreement to arbitrate?127 If the
answer to both questions is “yes,” then the court must enforce
the arbitration agreement and permit the arbitrator to
determine the res judicata issue. Otherwise, the court
decides the issue.128
A. The Analytical Framework
1. QUESTION 1: Did the Parties Enter Into a Valid
Agreement to Arbitrate?
Question 1 focuses on the validity or enforceability of the
agreement to arbitrate. This inquiry must consider whether
the parties in fact agreed to arbitrate or whether their
consent to arbitration was otherwise valid.129 The focus of
124. See supra Part IV.
125. See Olick, 151 F.3d at 139-40.
126. See supra Part IV.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 51-54.
128. See id.
129. See, e.g., Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Belco Petrol. Corp., 88 F.3d 129,
135 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that the subject of Question (1) was whether “there
[was] a valid arbitration agreement between the parties at all” and citing the
example that “[t]he arbitrability issue in First Options was whether certain
individuals were bound by an agreement that they did not sign” (citations
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this question is whether there is a binding agreement to
arbitrate “some” issues, regardless of what those issues might
be.130 In raising the defense of res judicata, the party
resisting arbitration does not challenge the fact that the
parties agreed to arbitrate their dispute.131 On the contrary,
a party relying on res judicata contends that arbitration
based on an otherwise valid arbitration agreement is
precluded by the existence of a prior relevant decision. In
other words, the reliance on res judicata rests on the
assumption that the parties had validly entered into such an
agreement.132 Therefore, the defense of res judicata does not
in itself implicate a Question 1 inquiry, and assuming there is
no separate dispute that an otherwise valid arbitration
agreement exists,133 Question 1 must be answered in the
affirmative.
It is apparent that in each of the cases cited in Part IV,
the parties agreed to arbitrate “some” issues, including the
subject matter of the underlying dispute. Instead, the parties
disagreed as to whether the existence of a prior decision
precluded an otherwise valid arbitration agreement. For
instance, in National Union, although the insured argued
that the insurer was barred from seeking a second arbitration
under the expropriation policy between the parties, there was
no question that the policy contained an otherwise valid
arbitration clause.134 Similarly, in Kelly, while Merrill Lynch
omitted)).
130. Id. (finding that Question (1) was resolved since “there [was] no question
that the [contract between the parties] contains a valid agreement, binding on
[appellant], to arbitrate ‘some issues’”).
131. See, e.g., id. (rejecting appellant’s “characterization of the preclusion
issue . . . as part of the ‘arbitrability’ of the dispute” and noting that the
“preclusion issue is not, in the words of First Options, a disagreement over
‘whether [the parties] agreed to arbitrate the merits’ of their dispute” (quoting
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995))).
132. It would not matter what preclusive effect a prior decision has on
subsequent arbitration if such arbitration was never agreed to in the first place.
133. A party who resists arbitration by relying on a defense of res judicata
may, of course, in the alternative also dispute that it entered into a valid
arbitration agreement (for example, by alleging that it did not sign the
agreement), in which case, the court will have to examine the facts relevant to
that dispute to determine Question 1. The point here, however, is that the
reliance on the defense of res judicata itself does not place in contention the
issues that are the subject of Question 1.
134. See Nat’l Union, 88 F.3d at 135 (“[T]here [was] no question that the AIG
policy contains a valid agreement, binding on [the insured], to arbitrate ‘some
issues.’”).
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contended that the plaintiff customers were precluded from
seeking arbitration for state law claims as a result of a court
judgment arising from prior litigation between the parties,
there was no dispute that the parties had agreed to arbitrate
any state law claims arising from the contract between
them.135 Thus, Question 1 is answered in the affirmative
when posed to the cases in Part IV.
2. QUESTION 2: Is the Res Judicata Defense Within the
Scope of the Agreement to Arbitrate?
In asking whether the res judicata defense is within the
scope of the arbitration agreement, Question 2 focuses on the
particular terms of the agreement. Therefore, Question 2 is a
matter of contract interpretation.
If the agreement
specifically includes (or excludes) the res judicata defense as a
matter for arbitration, the court will have little difficulty in
resolving this question. However, most arbitration clauses,
including those discussed in Part IV, do not expressly refer to
res judicata.
Instead, they typically provide for the
arbitration of all disputes “arising out of”136 or “relating to”137
the parties’ agreement. The question then becomes whether
such broad language should encompass any res judicata
defense as a matter of general contract law.
The defense of res judicata, like any other affirmative
defense to the substantive claim, is simply part of the merits
of the underlying substantive dispute.138 As part of the
135. See Kelly v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 985 F.2d 1067,
1068 n.1 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1011 (1993) (“Each plaintiff had
previously signed a written agreement that . . . any controversy between us
arising out of . . . this agreement shall be settled by arbitration . . . .” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
136. See, e.g., id.; see also John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Olick, 151 F.3d
132, 140 (3d Cir. 1998) (“The parties’ arbitration agreement . . . submits to the
NASD ‘any dispute, claim or controversy that may arise between [the parties]
that is required to be arbitrated under the rules of [NASD].’”).
137. See, e.g., Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126,
1128 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[The parties] agreed to arbitrate ‘any dispute, controversy
or claim arising out of or relating to’ the [agreement].”).
138. See Nat’l Union, 88 F.3d at 135-36 (“[A] claim of preclusion is a legal
defense to [the substantive] claim. As such, it is itself a component of the
dispute on the merits. . . . It is as much related to the merits as such affirmative
defenses as a time limit in the arbitration agreement or laches.”). That res
judicata is properly characterized as an affirmative defense under federal law is
evidenced by Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires
parties affirmatively to plead a res judicata defense, as well as various other
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merits, the res judicata issue should be resolved along with,
and in the same manner as, the substantive dispute.
Therefore, assuming the court finds that the merits of the
dispute fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement, it
should also conclude that the defense of res judicata falls
within the scope of the arbitration agreement. This scenario
was present in the cases discussed in Part IV. As noted above
with regard to Question 1, while the parties in those cases
disagreed over who should determine the preclusive effect of a
prior decision, there was no doubt that they had agreed to
arbitrate the subject matter of the underlying dispute.139 It
follows, therefore, that the defense of res judicata falls within
the scope of the arbitration agreements in those cases as part
of the merits of the dispute.
Thus, when parties agree to arbitrate a claim under a
broad arbitration clause, they are deemed to have agreed to
arbitrate any defenses relating thereto, including that of res
judicata. Such an inclusive reading is consistent with general
principles of contract interpretation, as evidenced by the fact
that other affirmative defenses are similarly considered to be
included within the scope of a broad arbitration clause.140
Such a reading also comports with “the strong federal policy
in favor of arbitration,”141 under which the Supreme Court
has held that “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable
issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”142 This
policy has its roots in the contractual nature of arbitration
agreements, and is essentially a reaffirmation of the same
general principles of contract law.
As noted above, Question 2 is simply a matter of contract
interpretation. Where that contract is silent, the task for the
interpreter is to construct “the hypothetical bargain that the
parties themselves would have chosen in a completely
spelled-out agreement . . . or at least, the bargain that that it
defenses, including estoppel, laches, and statute of limitations. See FED. R. CIV.
P. 8(c).
139. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
140. See Nat’l Union, 88 F.3d at 135-36 (noting that res judicata is no
different from other affirmative defenses, which are “a component of the dispute
on the merits” and “are assigned to an arbitrator under a broad arbitration
clause [that did not provide specifically for such defenses]”).
141. Olick, 151 F.3d at 137.
142. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983).

WONG_FINAL.DOC

2005]

11/28/2005 1:17 PM

RES JUDICATA AND ARBITRATION

71

would be rational for [most similarly-situated] parties to have
chosen ex ante.”143 As the Supreme Court has explained, the
issue of whether the res judicata defense is within the scope
of the arbitration agreement is not an esoteric matter and
“parties likely gave at least some thought to [what falls
within] the scope of arbitration.”144 This being the case, and
given that the law favors arbitration, the more rational
interpretation is that parties would assume that the res
judicata defense is arbitrable and the onus would be on
parties who did not wish to arbitrate the matter to clearly
indicate this.145 As such, “issues will be deemed arbitrable
unless ‘it is clear that the arbitration clause has not included’
them.”146 In other words, Question 2 is to be answered in the
affirmative under these circumstances.
B. The General Rule
Once Questions 1 and 2 are answered affirmatively, the
court in each case must, barring any “grounds that exist at
law and equity for the revocation of any contract,”147 enforce
the respective agreements to arbitrate the dispute, including
the res judicata defense.148 This boils down to the proposition
that where a court finds the underlying dispute arbitrable,
the res judicata issue is also arbitrable, and in the absence of
legal and equitable grounds for revoking a contract, the court
must enforce the arbitration agreement. The general rule,
therefore, is that the arbitrator gets to decide the res judicata
defense in a dispute governed by a broad arbitration clause,
provided the underlying dispute falls within the scope of the
clause.

143. Alan Scott Rau, Everything You Really Need to Know About
“Separability” in Seventeen Simple Propositions, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 34
(2003). For my own possibly contrary purposes, I quote a commentator’s
description of the purpose of “default rules” employed in contract law to divine
the intent of parties in the absence of direct evidence relating thereto. See id.
144. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995).
145. See id. (noting that given “the law’s permissive policies in respect of
arbitration, . . . one can understand why the law would insist on clarity before
concluding that the parties did not want to arbitrate a related matter” (citations
omitted)).
146. Id. (quoting 1 G. WILNER, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION §
12.01, at 156 (rev. ed. Supp. 1993)).
147. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
148. See id.
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C. The Limited Exception to the General Rule
The general rule would suggest that the proper result in
all of the cases discussed in Part IV is that the arbitrator
should determine the res judicata defense. However, the
opposite conclusion was reached in those cases where the
prior decision was an earlier judgment of the same court.149
Such cases are distinguishable on the ground that the courts
deciding them had also authored the respective prior
decisions whose preclusive effects were at issue.150 Having
issued the very decisions that are under consideration, those
courts are naturally more qualified than anyone else,
including any arbitrator, to determine correctly their
substance and scope, and therefore, any preclusive effects
they may have on subsequent arbitration.151 In this situation,
it makes sense to assume that the parties would instead have
expected the court—the more qualified candidate for the job—
to determine the res judicata issue.
In a recent case that involved the application of an
arbitration rule to determine a dispute’s arbitrability, the
Supreme
Court
observed
that
arbitrators,
being
“comparatively more expert about the meaning of their own
rule, are comparatively better able to interpret and to apply
it.”152 As such, the Court concluded that “in the absence of
any statement to the contrary in the arbitration agreement, it
is reasonable to infer that the parties intended the agreement
to reflect that understanding.”153 Similarly, following this
reasoning, where the prior decision at issue is a judgment
issued by the court, it is “reasonable to infer” that the parties
intended their agreement to reflect the understanding that
149. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
150. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
151. See In re Y & A Group Sec. Litig., 38 F.3d 380, 383 (8th Cir. 1994) (“The
district court, and not the arbitration panel, is the best interpreter of its own
judgment.”).
152. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 85 (2002) (emphasis
added).
153. Id. (citing First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944-45
(1995)). Cf. Bros. Jurewicz, Inc. v. Atari, Inc., 296 N.W.2d 422, 428 n.7 (Minn.
1980) (holding that the court should rule on a laches defense to a request for
arbitration where the defense was based on activity before that very court
because it would be “more efficient and practical for the trial judge, who
presumably is familiar with what has transpired in the litigation, to decide the
issue of laches than for an arbitrator who has had no connection with the
litigation”).
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the court, being “comparatively more expert” about the
meaning of its “own” judgment, is comparatively better able
to interpret and to apply it.
Thus, the general rule that an arbitrator should decide
the res judicata issue does not apply here because it is not
reasonable to assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate the
res judicata defense under these circumstances. Or, put in
terms of Question 2, the res judicata issue would not be
deemed within the scope of a broad arbitration clause when
the prior decision was a court’s own judgment. This is
because the parties would not rationally have assigned the
dispute’s resolution ex ante to an arbitrator instead of the
court where the latter was better equipped to do the job.
Accordingly, the court should determine the res judicata issue
in that situation.
Furthermore, this result holds true even if we disregard
the expertise factor and assume that the parties had agreed
to arbitrate the res judicata issue.
Because such an
agreement would circumscribe the court’s ability to protect
the integrity of its own judgments, it would be unenforceable.
It is well established that courts are entitled to protect the
integrity of their judgments.154 Under both common law and
statutory law,155 federal courts are given broad injunctive
powers to enforce their judgments and to prevent undue
interference therewith.156 This power includes the authority
to prevent repetitive litigation of claims already determined
by a court’s final judgment since such litigation undermines
the judgment.157 For the same reasons, federal courts are also
154. See infra notes 155-56.
155. See All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000).
156. See Wesch v. Folsom, 6 F.3d 1465, 1470 (11th Cir. 1993) (noting that the
“long recognized power of courts of equity to effectuate their decrees by
injunctions or writs of assistance” had been codified in the All Writs Statute,
which “empowers courts to issue injunctions to protect or effectuate their
judgments” (citations omitted)); Miss. Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States,
273 F. Supp. 1, 6 (E.D. Mich. 1967) (“It is well settled that the courts of the
United States have inherent and statutory (28 U.S.C. § 1651) power and
authority to enter such orders as may be necessary to enforce and effectuate
their lawful orders and judgments, and to prevent them from being thwarted
and interfered with . . . .” (citations omitted)); Gregis v. Edberg, 645 F. Supp.
1153, 1157 (W.D. Pa. 1986), aff’d, 826 F.2d 1054 (3d Cir. 1987).
157. See Wesch, 6 F.3d at 1470 (noting that courts are empowered under the
All Writs Act to issue injunctions in order to “avoid relitigation of questions once
settled between the same parties”); Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Ref.
Co., 441 F.2d 631, 637 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971) (“Under
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empowered to enjoin arbitration to prevent relitigating claims
that have been, or could have been, resolved by a court’s prior
final judgment.158 Accordingly, an agreement to arbitrate the
res judicata defense arising from such a judgment is
unenforceable as it would deprive the court of its ability to
protect its own judgment.159 In the context of the Arbitration
Act, the potential usurpation of the court’s power to protect
its judgments represents “such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract,” thereby relieving
the court of the obligation to enforce such an agreement.160
Where this is the case, the court should proceed to determine
the res judicata issue. Thus, regardless of whether there is
an agreement to arbitrate the res judicata defense with
respect to a prior decision, a court should rule on that
defense, rather than permit its arbitration, when the prior
decision at issue is its own judgment.
This result also corresponds to, and therefore draws
support from, that reached by courts in resolving the question
of who should determine whether a party who has
participated in litigation has waived its right to arbitration
because of such participation. In the case of Reid Burton
Construction, Inc. v. Carpenters District Council of Southern
Colorado,161 an employer had filed an action in federal court
against certain unions alleging the violation of a no-strike
clause in the parties’ collective bargaining agreement.162 The
the All Writs Statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1651, a federal court has the power to
enjoin a party before it from attempting to relitigate the same issues in another
federal court.” (footnote and citations omitted)); Michigan v. City of Allen Park,
573 F. Supp. 1481, 1487 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (“It is well established that a court
has the power under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, to enjoin the repetitive
litigation of the same action.” (footnote and citations omitted)).
158. See Kelly v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 985 F.2d 1067,
1069 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1011 (1993) (noting that the federal
courts’ powers under the All Writs Act “include[] the authority to enjoin
arbitration to prevent re-litigation” (citations omitted)); Sheldon Co. Profit
Sharing Plan & Trust v. Smith, 858 F. Supp. 663, 667 (W.D. Mich. 1994)
(“Under the All-Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, . . . a federal court has broad
injunctive powers to protect its own judgment, including the power to enjoin
arbitration in the interests of preventing relitigation of claims and issues it has
already decided.” (citation omitted)).
159. See Kelly, 985 F.2d at 1069.
160. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). For the text of the full provision, see supra text
accompanying note 37.
161. Reid Burton Constr., Inc. v. Carpenters Dist. Council of S. Colo., 535
F.2d 598 (10th Cir. 1976).
162. Id. at 599-600.
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unions argued in response that the court had no jurisdiction
over the dispute since the collective bargaining agreement
ultimately referred any “dispute . . . involving the application
or interpretation of the terms of th[e] agreement” to
arbitration.163 They further stated that one of the defendant
unions, Local 1340, was not even a party to the collective
bargaining agreement.164
However, a year after the
complaint was filed, the unions admitted that while they did
not consider Local 1340 to be a “party” to the collective
bargaining agreement, they considered it to be “bound by the
substantive terms of the agreement.”165
In its trial
memorandum, the employer responded by asserting that such
dilatory pleading practices before the court estopped the
unions from claiming any right to arbitration.166
Confronting this issue at trial, the district court first
determined whether a judicial proceeding or arbitration was
the proper forum for deciding the waiver issue.167 The court
found that because the arbitration clause was broadly
worded, the issue of waiver, like any other equitable defense,
was to be determined by the arbitrator.168
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed.169 While the
general rule was that equitable defenses were considered to
be within the scope of a broadly worded arbitration clause,
and thus arbitrable, it did not apply in this case because the
waiver defense at issue involved conduct before the district
court itself.170 Further, the court found that allowing an
arbitrator to decide the issue would compromise the court’s
control of its own proceedings.171
The court of appeals evaluated the arbitrability of the
waiver issue by objectively looking to the collective
bargaining agreement to determine the parties’ intent.172 It
concluded that while the language of the clause was broad

163. Id. at 602 (quoting terms of collective bargaining agreement).
164. Id. at 600.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 602.
167. Reid Burton, 535 F.2d at 602.
168. See id.
169. See id. at 604.
170. See id. at 603. The conduct at issue here was the aforementioned
dilatory pleading tactics before the court.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 603-04.
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enough to cover the waiver issue, it “d[id] not believe that the
parties ever intended to include the arbitration of equitable
defenses arising out of actions before a district court.”173 In
any event,
even had the parties so intended, [the court] would
conclude that such an agreement would clearly exceed the
proper subject matter of a collective bargaining agreement
and would not be enforceable in court; it would be
improper for the prospective parties of a lawsuit to
attempt by contract to bind the exercise of a court’s
inherent judicial function.174

After all, “[c]ourts must, of course, maintain judicial
control of their own proceedings”175 and “[s]uch power . . . is
broad enough to include a court’s determination of the
validity of equitable defenses arising out of the action before
the court. To hold otherwise would unnecessarily hamper a
court’s control of its own proceedings.”176
Other courts have also held that the validity of an
equitable defense is to be determined by the court, rather
than the arbitrator, where the defense curbs the exercise of
the court’s “judicial function.” In Brothers Jurewicz, Inc. v.
Atari, Inc.,177 the Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed the
trial court’s determination that it, rather than an arbitrator,
was to decide whether the plaintiff manufacturer lost its right
to arbitration under an otherwise valid arbitration agreement
between the parties because it failed to request arbitration
until a year after the initiation of litigation before the trial
court.178 The court held that while the general rule was that
arbitrators should determine such equitable defenses under a
broad arbitration clause, there were several reasons to carve
out a “limited exception which allows courts to rule on a
laches defense to a request for arbitration in cases where the
defense is not based on the underlying dispute but instead is
173. Reid Burton, 535 F.2d at 604.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 603.
176. Id.
177. Bros. Jurewicz, Inc. v. Atari, Inc., 296 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1980).
178. Id. at 428. Although this is a state case decided under Minnesota’s
Uniform Arbitration Act, and not the Federal Arbitration Act, one would
approach this issue similarly under both statutes. See id. at 427 n.5 (noting
that despite certain differences between the statutes, “the issue here considered
is presented similarly under both acts”).
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derived from activity before the very court being urged to
compel arbitration.”179 For one, “issues such as laches may be
beyond the scope of even a broadly worded arbitration clause
since it is unlikely that an arbitration agreement ‘ever
intended to include the arbitration of equitable defenses
arising out of actions by a party in proceedings before a [trial]
court.’”180 The court also observed that it would be “more
efficient and practical for the trial judge, who presumably is
familiar with what has transpired in the litigation, to decide
the issue of laches than for an arbitrator who has had no
connection with the litigation.”181 Another significant reason
lies in the fact that “courts must maintain sufficient judicial
control over their own proceedings to determine the validity
of equitable defenses that arise out of the actions of parties
before the court.”182
Similarly, the question of whether a prior judgment of
the court precludes subsequent arbitration should not be
considered within the scope of a broadly worded arbitration
clause. This is because it is unlikely that the parties would
have agreed to arbitrate an issue arising from earlier
proceedings between them before the same court.183 Since
that court would be familiar with the issue, it would also be
in the best position to resolve it.184 Even if the parties had
intended this result, such an agreement would “clearly exceed
the proper subject matter”185 of an arbitration agreement and
“would not be enforceable in court; it would be improper for
the prospective parties of a lawsuit to attempt by contract to
bind the exercise of a court’s inherent judicial function”186
insofar as it hampers the ability of the court to protect its own
judgments.187 Thus, to paraphrase the court in Brothers
Jurewicz, while the general rule is that arbitrators should
determine the preclusive effects of prior decisions on
subsequent arbitration, there should be a limited exception
allowing courts to rule on a res judicata defense to a request
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 427-28.
Id. (quoting Reid Burton, 535 F.2d at 604).
Id. at 428 n.7.
Id. at 427.
See Reid Burton, 535 F.2d at 604.
See id. at 603.
Id. at 604.
Id.
Id.
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for arbitration in cases where the prior decision is a judgment
issued by the very court being urged to compel arbitration.188
The adoption of this rule and its exception (the “proposed
rule”), explicates and imposes order on the existing case law,
including those cases discussed in Part IV. Indeed, certain
threads of its supporting rationale, if somewhat tangled, can
be discerned in those cases. For example, in In re Y & A,
where the prior decision at issue was an earlier judgment of
the district court, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower
court’s decision to enjoin arbitration rather than allow the
arbitrator to determine the defense, on the ground that it was
“[t]he district court, and not the arbitration panel, [who was]
the best interpreter of its own judgment.”189 The court of
appeals pointed to the fact that “[t]he All Writs Act makes
plain that each federal court is the sole arbiter of how to
protect its judgments.”190 In Chiron, where the prior decision
in question was an arbitral award, the court held that the
arbitrator was to decide the issue, and distinguished In re Y
& A and Kelly on the ground that they both “involved the
court determining the res judicata effect of its own prior
judgment on a subsequent arbitration proceeding.”191 The
court also observed that the rationale expressed in those
cases “rests on the presumption that the court issuing the
original decision is best equipped to determine what was
considered and decided in that decision and thus what is or is
not precluded by that decision.”192 Although the courts did
not proceed to spell out how these issues bore on any
arbitration agreement between the parties in the context of
the Arbitration Act, they properly relied on them to reach the
correct result.
VI. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON THE ARBITRABILITY OF
ARBITRABILITY
The rule proposed in this article is also consistent with
the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court in this area of law.
188. See Bros. Jurewicz, Inc. v. Atari, Inc., 296 N.W.2d 422, 427-28 (Minn.
1980); supra text accompanying note 179.
189. In re Y & A Group Sec. Litig., 38 F.3d 380, 383 (8th Cir. 1994).
190. Id. at 382-83.
191. Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1134 (9th
Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
192. Id.
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While the Court has yet to address the res judicata issue
specifically, it has considered arbitrability questions that bear
on the issue. In particular, two decisions are relevant to the
res judicata question. The first is First Options of Chicago,
Inc. v. Kaplan,193 in which the Court laid down principles
governing the question of who should determine the
arbitrability of a dispute.194 The second decision is Howsam
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,195 in which the Court refined
those principles, differentiating between substantive and
procedural questions of arbitrability.196
A. Cases Bearing on the Res Judicata Issue
1. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan
In First Options, the question before the Court was
whether the district court or the arbitrator should decide
whether the respondents were bound to arbitrate a dispute
between the parties under an arbitration agreement that the
respondents claimed not to have signed.197 In ruling that the
district court should decide the issue, the Court first
distinguished between (A) the “arbitrability” of a dispute,198 or
whether the parties have submitted a particular dispute to
arbitration and, (B) the separate issue of who, court or
arbitrator, determines “arbitrability.”199 The Court found
that just as the arbitrability of a dispute depends upon
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute, the
determination of who decides arbitrability “turns upon what
193. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
194. See id. at 942.
195. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
196. See id. at 85.
197. First Options, 514 U.S. at 942.
198. As discussed above, the “arbitrability” of a dispute comprises the
question of whether there exists a valid agreement to arbitrate under the
contract in question, and if so, whether the particular dispute sought to be
arbitrated falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement. See supra notes
51-53 and accompanying text. Note, however, that First Options deals
specifically with the first kind of arbitrability question (i.e., Question (1)) and
appears for that reason to define “arbitrability” only in that sense. It is plain,
however, that “arbitrability” is a broader concept that also includes the second
type of arbitrability question (i.e., Question (2)) since a dispute over whether a
particular matter falls within the scope of the arbitration clause is ultimately a
dispute over whether the parties had agreed to arbitrate that matter (i.e., the
“arbitrability” of a dispute). See supra note 53.
199. First Options, 514 U.S. at 942.
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the parties agreed about that matter.”200 If the parties had
agreed to arbitrate arbitrability, then the arbitrator should
get to decide whether the dispute is arbitrable.201 On the
other hand, if the parties had not agreed to submit the
arbitrability questions to arbitration, then the court should
decide the question independently, just as it would any
question not submitted to arbitration.202 The Court derived
these conclusions from “the fact that arbitration is simply a
matter of contract between the parties; it is a way to resolve
those disputes—but only those disputes—that the parties
have agreed to submit to arbitration.”203
To determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate
arbitrability, the First Options Court applied state law
principles governing the formation of contracts, just as it
would in deciding whether a contract existed.204 In First
Options, those principles required the Court to decide
whether the parties objectively revealed an intent to submit
the arbitrability issue to arbitration.205 Not surprisingly, the
agreement did not expressly include the matter of the
arbitrability of any dispute within the scope of its arbitration
clause.206
Nor, however, did the agreement specifically
exclude it.207 Thus, the question became one of how “to
interpret silence or ambiguity on the ‘who should decide
arbitrability’ point.”208
Applying
standard
principles
of
contractual
interpretation, the Court ruled that “[c]ourts should not
assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability
unless there is ‘clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]’ evidence that they
did so.”209 Courts, not arbitrators, should determine the
arbitrability issue unless, for example, the agreement
specifically provides otherwise. Such a presumption applies
in that situation because the question of who should

200. Id. at 943.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See id.
205. See First Options, 514 U.S. at 944.
206. See id. at 946.
207. See id.
208. Id. at 945.
209. Id. at 944 (quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers, 475 U.S.
643, 649 (1986)).
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determine arbitrability is a higher-level question that is so
“arcane” that the parties are unlikely to have considered it
when drawing up the arbitration agreement.210 Therefore,
the parties would likely not have expected an arbitrator to
decide the “who” question.211
As the Court also pointed out, the presumption applicable
to the “who” question is exactly opposite to the presumption
applied when a court is faced with silence or ambiguity on the
arbitrability question itself, which is “whether a particular
merits-related dispute is arbitrable because it is within the
scope of a valid arbitration agreement.”212 The presumption
in the latter situation is that “any doubts concerning the
scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration,”213 and courts must thereby allow arbitrators to
determine the issue.214 This is because the latter question
arises when it is not reasonably disputed that the parties
have agreed to the arbitration of some issues; the dispute,
rather, is over the scope of the arbitration clause.215 “In such
circumstances, the parties likely gave at least some thought
to the scope of arbitration.”216 As such, the parties likely
would have expected an arbitrator to decide the question.217
In sum, under First Options, the approach to answering
either question is simply to identify the relevant terms of the
parties’ agreement and then to uphold such agreements
where they exist.218 In the absence of a “completely spelledout agreement,” that task would be to figure out what such a
“hypothetical” agreement would likely have provided, and to
enforce it accordingly.219 Thus, because the parties in First
Options were unlikely to have considered the question of who
should determine whether the particular dispute was
arbitrable when they concluded the arbitration agreement,
the Court applied the presumption that the parties would not
have expected the matter to go to arbitration and held that
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

See id. at 945.
See First Options, 514 U.S. at 945.
Id. at 944-45.
Id. at 945 (citation omitted).
See id.
See id.
Id.
First Options, 514 U.S. at 945.
See id. at 943.
Cf. supra text accompanying note 143.
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This
the district court should decide this question.220
conclusion appears to suggest that a court should determine
the arbitrability of any dispute since, as the Court defined it,
a “who” question was a higher-level inquiry.221 However, as
discussed below, the Court went on to clarify in Howsam v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.222 that the presumption that a
court should determine the “who” question applies only to
substantive, and not procedural, questions of arbitrability.223
2. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
In Howsam, a securities broker brought suit in federal
court seeking to enjoin its customer from arbitrating a
dispute before the National Association of Securities Dealers
(“NASD”) on the ground that the customer was time-barred
under an arbitration rule of NASD for initiating its request
for arbitration more than six years after the dispute.224 The
district court dismissed the action, holding that the question
of whether the arbitration was time-barred was one for the
arbitrator.225 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed.226 Purporting to follow First Options,227 the court of
appeals determined that the issue was one for the district
court because, in its view, “application of the NASD rule
presented a question of the underlying dispute’s
‘arbitrability’; and the presumption is that a court, not an
arbitrator, will ordinarily decide an ‘arbitrability’ question.”228
The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the court of
appeals, concluding that “the applicability of the NASD time
limit rule is a matter presumptively for the arbitrator, not for
the judge.”229 The Court explained that not all inquiries into
questions of arbitrability—what it termed “potentially

220. See First Options, 514 U.S. at 946-47.
221. See id. at 944-45.
222. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
223. See infra Part VI.A.2.
224. Howsam, 537 U.S. 79 (2002). The NASD rule in question provided that
no dispute “shall be eligible for submission to arbitration . . . where six (6) years
have elapsed from the occurrence or event giving rise to the . . . dispute.” Id. at
81 (quoting NASD Code of Arbitration § 10304 (1984)).
225. Id. at 82.
226. Id.
227. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
228. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 82 (citation omitted).
229. Id. at 85.
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under
the
dispositive
gateway
question[s]”230—fell
interpretive rule applied in First Options.231 In this respect,
the Court distinguished between “substantive” questions of
arbitrability, which fall under the interpretive rule, and
“procedural” questions of arbitrability, which do not.232
Substantive questions of arbitrability belong to the group
of questions that arise
in the kind of narrow circumstance where contracting
parties would likely have expected a court to have decided
the gateway matter, where they are not likely to have
thought that they had agreed that an arbitrator would do
so, and, consequently, where reference of the gateway
dispute to the court avoids the risk of forcing parties to
arbitrate a matter that they may well not have agreed to
arbitrate.233

Examples of such substantive questions of arbitrability
include disputes about whether the parties are bound by a
given arbitration clause,234 and disagreements over whether
an arbitration clause in a concededly binding controversy
The
applies to a particular type of controversy.235
presumption in these cases, in line with the parties’
expectations, was that the court should determine the
questions of arbitrability.236
In contrast, procedural questions of arbitrability come
under the group of questions that arise in “other kinds of
general circumstance[s] where parties would likely expect
that an arbitrator would decide the gateway matter” and are
presumptively for the arbitrator to decide.237 Examples of
such questions include procedural defenses to arbitrability,
such as waiver or delay.238
In Howsam, the Court also noted that this distinction
230. Id. at 83.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 85.
233. Id. at 83-84.
234. See, e.g., First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
235. See, e.g., AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers, 475 U.S. 643 (1986)
(concerning whether a labor-management layoff controversy fell within the
arbitration clause of a collective-bargaining agreement).
236. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83.
237. Id. at 84.
238. See id.; see also Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (finding a contract dispute between the parties to be
arbitrable even with the addition of claims of waiver and delay).
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between “substantive” and “procedural” questions of
arbitrability finds support in the Revised Uniform Arbitration
Act of 2000 (“RUAA”).239 The RUAA provides that:
in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, issues of
substantive arbitrability . . . are for a court to decide and
issues of procedural arbitrability, i.e., whether
prerequisites such as time limits, notice, laches, estoppel,
and other conditions precedent to an obligation to
arbitrate have been met, are for the arbitrators to
decide.240

Applying this dichotomous analysis, the Howsam Court
determined that the applicability of the NASD time limit rule
more closely resembled a “procedural” question of
arbitrability and was, therefore, a matter for the arbitrator
and not the court.241 It found support for this conclusion in
the fact that
NASD arbitrators, comparatively more expert about the
meaning of their own rule, are comparatively better able
to interpret and to apply it. In the absence of any
statement to the contrary in the arbitration agreement, it
is reasonable to infer that the parties intended the
agreement to reflect that understanding.242

Under a straightforward reading of Howsam, one need
only ascertain the nature of the arbitrability question to
figure out whether a court or an arbitrator should decide it.
Thus, a court decides substantive questions of arbitrability,
whereas an arbitrator resolves procedural questions of
arbitrability.
B. Applying Howsam’s Procedural/Substantive Divide to the
Res Judicata Issue
While the Howsam test is straightforward in concept, its
application to the res judicata issue is complicated by the fact
that the defense of res judicta is not monolithic in nature.
Rather, as explained below, depending on the nature of the
prior decision, the defense of res judicta is either procedural
or substantive, at least within the meaning of these terms as
239. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84-85.
240. Id. at 85 (quoting Revised Uniform Arbitration Act of 2000 § 6 cmt. 2, 7
U.L.A. 13 (Supp. 2002)).
241. Id. at 85-86.
242. Id. at 85 (citation omitted).
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employed in Howsam.243
The procedural/substantive split is no more than
shorthand for determining, in the absence of explicit guidance
in the arbitration agreement, who the parties agreed would
be the decisionmaker. This correspondence derives from the
fact that arbitration is simply “a matter of contract,”244 and
the question of who should decide any arbitrability question
ultimately turns on what the parties agreed.245 Accordingly,
the Court spoke of “procedural” questions as those arising in
circumstances “where parties would likely expect that an
arbitrator would decide the gateway matter,”246 whereas it
described “substantive” questions as those arising in those
circumstances “where contracting parties would likely have
expected a court to have decided the gateway matter.”247 In
other words, this dichotomy is simply a device of contractual
interpretation designed to minimize, if not avoid, “the risk of
forcing parties to arbitrate a matter that they may well not
have agreed to arbitrate,” and vice versa.248
As noted above, in the ordinary situation where res
judicata operates as a defense to arbitration, it is no different
from other affirmative defenses, such as waiver or laches.249
Parties likely expect arbitrators to decide the arbitrability of
affirmative defenses, including res judicata. Therefore, under
Howsam, whether res judicata precludes subsequent
arbitration is generally a procedural question of
arbitrability.250 The presumption then is that the arbitrator
decides the issue.251 This conclusion is consistent with the
proposed general rule that the res judicata issue is a matter

243. See infra text accompanying notes 244-54.
244. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83 (quoting Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav.
Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)).
245. Id. See also First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943
(1995) (“Just as the arbitrability of the merits of a dispute depends upon
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute, so the question ‘who has
the primary power to decide arbitrability’ turns upon what the parties agreed
about that matter.” (citations omitted)).
246. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84.
247. Id. at 83. Notably, the Court itself does not label the two relevant
categories of arbitrability questions as “procedural” and “substantive,” although
the RUAA, upon which it relies, does. See supra notes 239-40.
248. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 138-39.
250. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 85.
251. Id. at 84.
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for the arbitrator.
However, as explained above, where the prior decision at
issue is a judgment of the court being asked to compel
arbitration, it is more reasonable to infer that the parties had
not agreed to arbitrate the res judicata issue, but rather, had
expected the court to decide it.252 To paraphrase the Court in
Howsam, this is because the court, being comparatively more
expert about the meaning of its own judgment, is better able
to interpret the decision and determine its preclusive
effects.253 Further, as the Court also noted, “for the law to
assume an expectation that aligns (1) decisionmaker with (2)
comparative expertise will help better to secure a fair and
expeditious resolution of the underlying controversy—a goal
of arbitration systems and judicial systems alike.”254 As such,
where the prior decision is the court’s own judgment, the res
judicata issue is “substantive” in the narrow sense relied on
in Howsam, meaning that the court should decide the issue.
Thus, the rule proposed by this article is consistent with
Supreme Court decisions because it requires a court to
determine the res judicata effect of its own prior judgments, a
“substantive” question of arbitrability, and otherwise requires
an arbitrator to determine the preclusive effects of prior
decisions, a “procedural” question of arbitrability.
VII. APPLICATION AND REFINEMENT OF THE PROPOSED RULE
For the most part, the proposed rule is as simple to apply
as it is to state: courts decide the preclusive effects of their
own prior judgments on subsequent arbitration, while
arbitrators determine the preclusive effects of all other prior
decisions on subsequent arbitration. However, there are
several situations in which the rule’s application is less
straightforward and warrants closer examination.
A. Entry of Judgment Upon an Arbitral Award
Section 9 of the Arbitration Act provides that “[i]f the
parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the
court shall be entered upon the [arbitral] award,” the court
must confirm and enter judgment upon the award upon a
252. See supra text accompanying notes 151-53.
253. See supra text accompanying note 242.
254. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 85.
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timely request from any party to the award.255 Additionally,
under § 13 of the Act, the resultant judgment has “the same
force and effect, in all respects, as, and [is] subject to all the
provisions of law relating to, a judgment in an action.”256 The
question then arises whether such a decision is to be treated,
for the purposes of the proposed rule, as an arbitral award or
a judgment.
This question was examined in Chiron,257 a case
discussed above.258 Relying on language in the Act,259 the
party opposing arbitration argued that the court should treat
a previously confirmed arbitral award as if it were a
judgment rendered in a judicial proceeding, and thereby
determine its preclusive effect on subsequent arbitration.260
Rejecting this argument, the court of appeals found instead
that a judgment obtained under § 13 of the Arbitration Act
should be considered an arbitral award for preclusion
purposes.261 The court observed that the approach advocated
by the party opposing arbitration only begged the question
since the Arbitration Act “says nothing about which forum or
who determines the effect of the judgment.”262 In addition,
the court noted that while a judgment entered upon a
confirmed arbitration award has the same force and effect
under the Arbitration Act as a court judgment for
enforcement purposes, it was not equivalent to a court
judgment for all purposes.263
For example, while the
Arbitration Act requires a court to enter judgment upon a
confirmed arbitral award absent very limited grounds, a
judgment upon a decision rendered by the court endorses and
confirms the merits of that decision.264 Along the same lines,
a judgment under § 13 of the Arbitration Act, unlike one
arising from a judicial proceeding, may not be reopened and
255. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2000).
256. Id. § 13.
257. Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostics Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir.
2000).
258. See supra text accompanying notes 92-103.
259. 9 U.S.C. § 13 (“The judgment so entered shall have the same force and
effect, in all respects, as . . . a judgment in an action; and it may be enforced as
if it had been rendered in an action in the court in which it is entered.”).
260. Chiron, 207 F.3d at 1133.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
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challenged under Rules 59 or 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or appealed unless the parties’ agreement
specifically provides otherwise.265 “In sum, a judgment upon
a confirmed arbitration award is qualitatively different from
a judgment in a court proceeding, even though the judgment
is recognized under the [Arbitration Act] for enforcement
purposes.”266
In support of its case, the party opposing arbitration in
Chiron cited cases determining that the court should decide
the res judicata issue,267 including In re Y & A and Kelly.268
The Chiron court, however, distinguished these cases as
involving “the court determining the res judicata effect of its
own prior judgment on a subsequent arbitration
proceeding.”269 The court noted that the justification in those
cases
rests on the presumption that the court issuing the
original decision is best equipped to determine what was
considered and decided in that decision and thus what is
or is not precluded by that decision. The policy underlying
these decisions is not served in this case, however, when
the district court merely confirmed the decision issued by
another entity, the arbitrator, and was not uniquely
qualified to ascertain its scope and preclusive effect.270

Thus, the Chiron court found that, for preclusion
purposes, a judgment under § 13 of the Arbitration Act is
more like an arbitral award than a judgment arising from a
judicial proceeding.271 For the same reasons, this conclusion
applies when the issue is analyzed under the proposed rule.
Because a judgment under § 13 of the Arbitration Act is not
an independent product of the court, there is no reason to
assume that the court is comparatively more expert in
determining its preclusive effect.272 As such, it follows that
there is no reason to assume that the parties would have
expected the court to decide the issue. Furthermore, the All
Writs Act arguably has no application in this situation, since
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

See id. at 1133.
Chiron, 207 F.3d at 1133-34.
Id. at 1133.
See supra text accompanying Part IV.A for a discussion of these cases.
Chiron, 207 F.3d at 1134 (citations omitted).
Id.
See id. at 1133-34.
See id. at 1134.
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it only “empowers federal courts to issue injunctions to
Therefore, a
protect or effectuate their judgments.”273
judgment under § 13 of the Arbitration Act should be treated
as an arbitral award for the purposes of the proposed rule.
Accordingly, an arbitrator should determine its res judicata
effect on subsequent arbitration.
B. Judgments of Courts Other Than Those Being Asked to
Compel Arbitration
The general rule that arbitrators should determine the
res judicata issue extends not only to the case where the prior
decision is an arbitral award but also where it is a judgment
of a court other than that being asked to compel
arbitration.274 The justification for the latter situation is
perhaps harder to discern and warrants closer examination.
As discussed above, the rationale for allowing arbitrators
to decide the issue under a broad arbitration agreement is
that it is more reasonable to assume that the parties have
agreed to arbitrate an affirmative defense such as res
judicata and is consistent with legislative policies favoring
arbitration.275 However, when the prior decision is an earlier
judgment of the court being asked to compel arbitration, this
assumption is not reasonable; instead, the parties would
likely have expected the court to decide the res judicata issue
given that the court, having issued the original decision, is
best equipped to determine what was considered and decided
in that decision.276 Because this exceptional circumstance
does not exist when the prior decision is a judgment from a
different court and there is as such no reason to regard the
court as more expert than the arbitrator, the general rule
continues to apply in that situation.
For example, if the question before a federal district court
is whether a prior state court decision precludes arbitration
because of res judicata, the district court should compel
arbitration and permit an arbitrator to decide the res judicata
issue.277 Since the district court was not the author of the
273. Wesch v. Folsom, 6 F.3d 1465, 1470 (11th Cir. 1993) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted). See also supra text accompanying notes 154-56.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 150, 188.
275. See supra Part V.A.
276. See supra Part V.C.
277. But cf. Miller Brewing Co. v. Fort Worth Distrib. Co. Inc., 781 F.2d 494
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prior state court decision, there is no reason to assume that
the district court would be any more qualified than the
arbitrator to determine the preclusive effects of the state
court decision.
There is accordingly no exceptional
circumstance displacing the prevailing assumption that the
parties agreed to arbitrate the issue, and the arbitrator
should be permitted to decide the res judicata effects of the
state court decision.
In sum, where the prior decision is a judgment of a court
other than the court that is asked to compel arbitration, the
presumption is that the arbitrator, and not the court, decides
its preclusive effect on subsequent arbitration.
C. Collateral Estoppel: The Exception to the Exception
Thus far, this article has focused on true res judicata and
has not yet examined issues of collateral estoppel. The reader
will recall that the two doctrines are distinct in that the
former operates to bar entire claims or causes of action that
were, or could have been, brought in a prior proceeding,
whereas the latter precludes only the relitigation of specific
issues that have been litigated in a prior proceeding.278 Thus,
when a party relies on collateral estoppel to preclude
arbitration, it seeks only to preclude the arbitration of certain
issues and not the entire claim. As such, “all that a party is
seeking is not to bar but merely to constrain the arbitrator”279
so as to “narrow the issues that the arbitrator may
consider”280 without necessarily challenging the arbitration of
the dispute generally.
Given these circumstances, it is arguable that the
arbitrator, and not the court, should decide the collateral
estoppel effects of the prior decision even when that prior
decision is a judgment of the court being asked to compel

(5th Cir. 1986). In Miller Brewing Co., the Fifth Circuit determined that the
party seeking arbitration was barred from doing so in federal court as a result
of the preclusive effects of a prior state court decision binding both parties.
Note, however, that the parties did not raise, and the court did not consider, the
specific issue concerning whether arbitrators, rather than the court, should
have determined that res judicata issue. See id.
277. Id. at 501.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24.
279. Miler v. Runyon, 77 F.3d 189, 194 (7th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added).
280. Id.
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arbitration.281 While the assumption remains that the court
is more qualified than the arbitrator to determine the
decision’s collateral estoppel effects, it is less clear that the
parties would have expected the court to decide the collateral
estoppel issue. This is because any resolution by the court of
the prior decision’s collateral estoppel effects would dispose of
only part of a claim, potentially leaving the rest for a separate
decisionmaker, i.e., the arbitrator. It seems unlikely that the
parties would have agreed to isolate a particular issue that
constitutes an aspect of the claim for the court to rule on,
while preserving the rest of the claim for arbitration. This
course of action would be inefficient and is incompatible with
the idea that parties seek out arbitration for its ease and
speed.282 Similarly, if it makes sense “for the law to assume
an expectation that aligns (1) [a] decisionmaker with (2)
comparative expertise”283 where it helps to secure the
“expeditious resolution of the underlying controversy,”284 then
such an assumption is at best questionable when the result is
one of greater inefficiency.285
Moreover, the court’s need to protect its own judgment,
which is otherwise an additional justification in favor of the
court determining arbitrability,286 is more limited in the
context of collateral estoppel because it affects only issues and
not entire claims. As discussed above,287 federal courts are
granted broad injunctive powers under the All Writs Act in
order to enforce their judgments and to prevent any undue
281. See, e.g., U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 101 F.3d 813 (2d Cir.
1996) (holding that the arbitrator and not the district court should decide
whether the insured was collaterally estopped from seeking arbitration against
the insurer for defense costs for bodily-injury claims in asbestos-related
litigation when the district court had previously declared that the insurer was
not liable for defense costs for property-damage claims in the asbestos-related
litigation).
282. See supra text accompanying note 4.
283. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 85 (2002).
284. Id.
285. Additionally, given that the arbitrator will only have to consider those
issues that were in fact decided in determining the prior judgment’s collateral
estoppel effects (and not make the determination as to what other claims could
theoretically have been brought, as it might have had to do to decide its res
judicata effects), see supra text accompanying notes 23-24, any advantage
stemming from the court’s greater expertise concerning its own judgment is
further reduced when collateral estoppel, and not res judicata, is involved.
286. See supra text accompanying note 158.
287. See supra text accompanying note 156.
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interference therewith.288 This power includes the authority
to prevent repetitive litigation of claims already determined
by a court’s final judgment since such litigation would
undermine that judgment.289
In the case of collateral
estoppel, only particular aspects of a claim decided by the
prior judgment, as opposed to entire claims, are subject to
reinterpretation.
Consequently, the chances that the
integrity of the judgment as a whole will be violated are
diminished, as is the need to invoke the All Writs Act.
Thus, in the absence of an arbitration agreement
providing otherwise, arbitrators rather than courts should
determine the collateral estoppel effects of a prior decision on
subsequent arbitration, including cases where the prior
decision is a judgment of the court being asked to compel
arbitration. As such, the exception to the proposed rule does
not apply in cases involving collateral estoppel. Instead, the
singular, unqualified rule in this situation is that the
arbitrator, and not the court, should determine the collateral
estoppel effects of all prior decisions.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the accommodations that must be made
in the situations discussed in the prior section, the rule
proposed by this article is by and large straightforward in its
application: arbitrators should determine whether prior
decisions preclude subsequent arbitration by virtue of the
doctrine of res judicata, except where the prior decision is a
judgment issued by the court being asked to compel
arbitration, in which case, that court should determine the
issue. The proposed rule reconciles the various federal
appellate decisions on the question of who should determine
whether res judicata precludes subsequent arbitration. More
importantly, it provides a coherent framework, derived from
the contractual nature of arbitration, for analyzing the
question under the Arbitration Act. The hope is that the
proposed rule will be employed by both courts and
arbitrators, who, in so doing, will give the law in this area
what it urgently needs—a reasoned uniformity.

288. See supra text accompanying notes 156-58.
289. See supra text accompanying note 158.

